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Introduction  
Laïcité was originally introduced in French law in order to ensure the freedom of 
conscience and religion, equality among the various faiths, and separation of the State and the 
Church. When the principle of laïcité is considered as the protection of the rights of all citizens 
to practice the religion of their choice, and for all religious groups to be treated equally and with 
respect, these values would appear to be incompatible with radicalization. Is it conceivable that 
this principle could be fostering homegrown radicalization? This paper argues that there is an 
evident gradual intensification of the implementation of laïcité in French society; it has come 
to impose several restrictions on how people are allowed to practice and express their religion 
and has become a subverted version of the very principles it was intended to uphold. In fact, 
the state now interferes more in religious affairs than in any other secular state.1 For the majority 
of French Muslims these restrictions cause frustration and feelings of discrimination, ostracism 
and exclusion. Also, laïcité feeds Islamophobic discourse against them, labelling them as angry, 
unstable members of society, who refuse to assimilate and do not uphold the values of the 
Republic; accusations which, as shall become evident, are unfounded and false. These 
restrictions affect different religions disproportionately and therefore laïcité may be perceived 
as failing to uphold the values of equality and neutrality.  
By studying the way in which perceptions affect the behavior of French citizens towards 
each other, it is possible to argue that escalated tensions due to a rise in terrorist attacks in the 
21st century, combined with the difficulties encountered by the French Muslim community to 
assimilate acceptably, may be leading to their social exclusion. Issues such as these, as well as 
an increasing visibility of Islam in France, have resulted in the ‘neutralisation’ of the public 
sphere according to a fundamentalist application of laïcité. Individuals who are excluded from 
society due to their religious affiliation are prone to ostracism, stigmatization and 
discrimination, as well as a perception of their situation as deprived and unjust2. Models of 
radicalization repeatedly propose psychological transformations leading to behavioral changes 
and resulting in the legitimization of violence. It is extremely interesting to see how an 
ostracized individual’s social relations, in combination with a psychological vulnerability 
caused by isolation from society, can lead to their radicalization. Thus, although the 
                                                             
1 Liogier, “Laicité on the Edge in France.” 
2 Laborde, Critical Republicanism, 216. 
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contingencies may not be initially evident, the role of laïcité in the homegrown radicalization 
of French Muslims is at the heart of this highly relevant research. 
The study begins by laying out the theoretical framework, suggesting the necessity for 
an interdisciplinary approach to the research question, and defining some theoretical concepts 
which are used throughout the paper. This is followed by a methodological explanation, where 
the qualitative research methods are elaborated on and process tracing as a methodology is 
described and justified. The subsequent three chapters are organised as follows. Chapter One 
introduces a historical perspective to debates on laïcité and its apparent ‘confrontation’ with 
Islam in particular. It is suggested that the exclusion of expressions of religious affiliation in 
the public sphere may be leading to the social isolation of French Muslims. Chapter Two founds 
the hypothesis in psychological theories and sociology, and thus establishes patterns linking the 
effects of laïcité and ostracism to the process of homegrown radicalization of French Muslims. 
The third Chapter constitutes two empirical investigations which connect the patterns and 
processes established in the two preceding chapters to carefully selected case studies. This 
method of inquiry helps to reduce the effects of ‘selection bias’, to which the hypothesising 
attempted in Chapter Two is perhaps susceptible, and to reveal causes not identified by the 
hypothesis, contributing to its further development. Last but not least, the Conclusion melds 
these three chapters by combining the pertinent conclusions drawn from each one. The 
summary of the key findings establishes relevant factors which explain homegrown 
radicalisation and provide evidence of where and how laïcité is contributing to these processes 
in the case of French Muslims. 
Theoretical Framework and Definitions 
The paper relies on a theoretical framework that lends coherence to the investigation 
allowing for an interdisciplinary approach. Accordingly, sociological studies are complemented 
by psychological theory, a crucial aspect for development of the study of terrorism, in order to 
properly understand the circumstances and conditions under which individuals become more or 
less susceptible to radicalisation. Different theoretical approaches have been chosen to improve 
the depth of the study, and to help to lay out the different stages which have an implication on 
the hypothesis. They are not so distant from each other, they are applicable within social science 
and compliment one-another. Sociological studies as well as those within the field of 
psychology are often used together and since the early twentieth century have frequently been 
combined to produce socio-psychological theories. This allows the hypothesis to be studied 
from dual theoretical perspectives: historical and socio-psychological, the outcomes of which 
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are grounded in descriptive observational studies provided by empirical research. The paper 
can thus be divided into two sections: one which describes the historical and theoretical factors, 
and the second which provides empirical elements by tracing evidence from the existing 
literature and field research in order to assess the hypothesis. 
Firstly, the historical narrative outlines France’s particularly turbulent history, wrought 
with conflict, which has instilled into the French consciousness a sentiment of intense pride for 
the Republic, it’s values and principles. This entails an interpretivist study from the perspective 
of sociological theory, drawing meaning from the experiences of French Muslims, French 
society, and their social interaction. Centuries of almost constant confrontations between the 
State and religion have led to many transformations of the relationships between the state and 
the citizens, the state and the church, and also the way in which French citizens relate to 
religion.3 These confrontations and relationships are key to understanding the current approach 
to secularism in France and have an important bearing on how the French perceive citizenship 
and identity.4 The culmination of ideological struggles resulted, during the Third Republic in 
1905, in the first pronouncement of laïcité in French law. Combined with the collective memory 
of the colonial period5, this renders the case of France even more complex6. 
Secondly, the thesis relies on theories of psychology of terrorism and socio-
psychological explanation of the process of radicalisation. It has been widely acknowledged by 
psychologists and psychiatrists that it is increasingly important to apply their expert knowledge 
to the study of terrorism. As Marta Crenshaw7 stated, “it is difficult to understand terrorism 
without psychological theory, because explaining terrorism must begin with analysing the 
intentions of the terrorist actor and the emotional reactions of audiences.”8 Many attempts at 
‘profiling’ have been made, and most conclusions do not go beyond generalising observations, 
as Jeff Victoroff, leading expert on human aggression, the psychology of terrorists and suicide 
bombers, states: “The field is largely characterized by theoretical speculation based on 
                                                             
3 Salton, “France’s Other Enlightenment.” 
4 Legal precedents to the 1905 law concern individuals’ rights and freedoms, and place restrictions on the 
influence of the church on the state (Loi du 15 mars 1850 sur l’enseignement -Loi Falloux- on schooling in 
France which was abrogated by the order no. 2000-549 15th June 2000) Plurality is guaranteed by legal 
recognition of some religions. 
5 Particularly the Algerian War of Independence, the roles played by different groups in French and Algerian 
society has had lasting implications on their families’ situation, their social, political and religious status. 
6 Bertossi, Christophe and Karakurt, Turkan, “Les Musulmans, La France, l’Europe.” 
7 Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Professor of Political Science at 
Stanford University 
8 Crenshaw (1990) as cited in: Silke, Terrorists, Victims, and Society. Xvii 
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subjective interpretation of anecdotal observations.”9 Although psychology is crucial to 
understanding terrorism and its perpetrators, it has “been a very minor contributor and one that 
has arguably grown less active and vigorous with time.”10 There are several speculations as to 
why there was decreased interest in pursuing these kinds of studies from a psychoanalytical 
perspective, however I would argue that this is no longer the case and that there is a renewal of 
interest in the study of psychology of terrorism. The lack of contributions to the study of 
terrorism from this perspective is due to the difficulty in gathering information on the topic, as 
“physical manifestations of terrorism as well as public responses to it are, in principle, much 
more accessible to research than the psychology and sociology of terrorists.” 11 The majority of 
studies are conducted following an incident, which is likely to have eliminated the perpetrator12, 
in which case the absence of an individual to study renders psychological research impossible. 
Many convicted terrorists may also be unable or unwilling to commit to such investigations.  
The thesis investigates the putative correlations and processes linking laïcité and the 
radicalisation of French Muslims. This effectual relationship is extremely understudied, 
although it has been approached in journals and the popular press13 , it is a sensitive topic which 
is avoided and infrequently debated in either English or French academic and scholarly 
literature. The hypothesis to be explored is that the gradual intensification of laïcité over recent 
decades has contributed to producing the circumstances under which certain individuals 
become more susceptible to extremist interpretations of Islam, and that in so doing, the state 
may be increasing the risk of radicalisation among French Muslim communities. Hereafter, this 
shall be referred to either as simply ‘the hypothesis’ or the ‘susceptibility to radicalisation’ 
theory. 
First and foremost, it is necessary to set out working definitions of the key concepts 
which this thesis addresses and which it relies upon in order to approach the hypothesis 
correctly. These are discussed as follows: laïcité, secular fundamentalism, terrorism, Islamism 
and jihadism, homegrown terrorism, radicalisation and ostracism. According to political theory, 
                                                             
9 Shaya, “How to Make an Anarchist-Terrorist,” 534. 
10 Silke, Terrorists, Victims, and Society. 
11 Silke. 
12 Perpetrator deaths (accidental or intentional – in the case of a suicide attack) as a result of their attacks have 
steadily increased, an 11% increase from 2014 to 2015 was recorded by the Department of Homeland Security 
Science and Technology Center of Excellence at the University of Maryland. 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “Annex of Statistical Information: 
Country Reports on Terrorism 2015.” 
13 Zaretski, “How French Secularism Became Fundamentalist”; McCants and Meserole, “The Francophone 
Factor: An Interpretation of Hostile Sunni Extremism in the World”; McCants and Meserole, “The French 
Connection.” 
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Laïcité can be understood as political and legal secularism or ‘the secular state’14. From a 
similar angle, Eoin Daly15 defines laïcité as ‘Constitutional Secularism’16, for the fact that apart 
from the law of 1905, the only outright mention of laïcité was made in the Constitution of the 
Fourth Republic: “France is an indivisible, secular (laique), democratic and social Republic”. 
Later this was supplemented by the phrase: “It ensures equality before the law to all citizens, 
without distinction of origin, race, or religion… it shall respect all beliefs,”17 within the 
Constitution of the Fifth Republic. However, it can also be viewed as a type of secular 
fundamentalism which is, in sociological terms, a doctrine which presumes that any alternative 
approach to that of the dominant ideology is unreasonable and therefore wrong. “The secular 
fundamentalist asserts that the supreme political value is to produce a political system that 
accepts liberal principles of political morality as embodiments of the supreme political value.”18 
That is to say, for the secular fundamentalist, the intensification of the application of laïcité, the 
laws and restrictions which ensue, are reasonable on the grounds that they actually permit 
citizens the freedom to adhere to their religion and other principles because this is delineated 
within the parameters of this overriding political value. It is possible to argue that laïcité has 
potentially become as demanding and intolerant of alternative approaches to the place of 
religion in the Fifth Republic as the traditional religious dogmas and beliefs it overcame and 
displaced in the Third. 
Terrorism,19 due to the array of variations of this term, its typologies, ideological origins 
and conceptions, as well as methods of execution, and despite the numerous qualitative and 
quantitative studies on it, remains a phenomenon which lacks a single working definition. 
Terrorism is commonly referred to as a form of political violence, listed among “war, genocide 
and ethnic cleansing among its main categories”20. Miller21 understands terrorism “as an 
illegitimate effort by subnational, clandestine factions to sabotage existing governing systems 
                                                             
14 Maclure, “Towards a Political Theory of Secularism,” 22. 
15 Political theorist of constitutional law 
16 Daly, “The Ambiguous Reach of Constitutional Secularism in Republican France: Revisiting the Idea of 
Laicite and Political Liberalism as Alternatives,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 32, no. 3 (September 1, 2012): 
583–608, doi:10.1093/ojls/gqs011. 
17 Conseil Constitutionelle, Constitution du 4 octobre 1958. 
“La France est une République indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale. Elle assure l’égalité devant la loi de 
tous les citoyens sans distinction d’origine, de race ou de religion. Elle respecte toutes les croyances.” 
18 Campos, “Secular Fundamentalism,” 1824. 
19 Locatelli, Andrea, “What Is Terrorism? Concepts, Definitions and Classifications.,” in Understanding 
Terrorism: A Socio-Economic Perspective, ed. Caruso, R. and Locatelli, A., First edition, vol. volume 22, 
Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development (Bingley, UK: Emerald Group 
Publishing, 2014), 1– 
20 Miller, The Foundations of Modern Terrorism, 1. 
21 Professor, Duke University History Department 
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and do great harm to innocent civilians in the process.”22 This definition is pertinent in the case 
of France which, unlike many European countries, has a long history of political violence. The 
use of violence as a means of achieving a political goal is also enumerated by Locatelli23,who, 
with reference to Charles Tilly24, understands this as “opposing (or sustaining, in the case of 
state terrorism) a given regime, claiming independence, calling for social revolution or fostering 
policy change.”25 
It is widely acknowledged that the Islamist threat deserves greater attention in terrorism 
studies as there are many misconceptions and misunderstandings of vital concepts and 
terminology such as Islamism and jihadism, and even Islamism and Islam, for example. 
Boubekeur26 discusses political Islam as experienced in Europe denoting “the recourse to Islam 
as the first justification of one’s political action, notably where demands are made vis-à-vis 
political authorities or in the methods of mobilisation and engagement proposed to Muslim 
communities”27. Although this type of Islam is adhered to by a minority, it is “this Islam that 
attracts European policy-maker’s attention when dealing with questions of radicalisation, 
institutionalisation of Islam, juridical adaptation of Islamic codes and the defence of citizenship 
rights for Muslim minorities.”28 Islamism is a term which can be associated with jihadism, a 
militarized and politicised Islam, providing “religious legitimisation of terrorism”, and can also 
be defined as a “terrorist branch of contemporary political Islam.”29  
There is an increasing awareness of the threat posed by homegrown terrorism in the 
West, and many issues surround it in European countries which are home to a large Muslim 
community. France is home to the majority of Europe’s Muslims, almost a third, although exact 
figures are difficult to come across due to French domestic policy prohibiting the authorities 
from collecting data referring to citizens’ religious affiliation or identity30. Radicalisation has 
been defined as a transformational process and a phenomenon which can lead to homegrown 
terrorism. Homegrown radicalisation refers to the radicalisation of individuals in their country 
of residence. Homegrown Islamist radicalisation can result in violent jihad and political 
                                                             
22 Miller, The Foundations of Modern Terrorism, 1. 
23 Andrea Locatelli is associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the Catholic University of the 
Sacred Heart, Milan 
24 American sociologist and political scientist 
25 Locatelli, Andrea, “What Is Terrorism?,” 8. 
26 Researcher at the Université Pierre-Mendès in Grenoble, France and Research Associate at the Centre Jacques 
Berque in Rabat, Morocco. 
27 Boubekeur, Amel, “European Islam,” 14. 
28 Boubekeur, Amel, 15. 
29 Tibi, Bassam, “Jihadism and Intercivilisational Conflict,” 42. 
30 Saba, Elizabeth, “The Difficulties of Muslim Integration in Europe.” 
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violence. This definition presumes “psychological transformations that occur among western 
Muslims as they increasingly accept the legitimacy of terrorism in support of violent jihad 
against Western countries.”31 
It has been suggested that, following the atrocious attacks on the Twin Towers (9/11), 
there was an increase of fear and Islamophobia in the West. Western Muslim communities felt 
unable to live up to expectations, to ‘prove’ their ‘Britishness’ or ‘Frenchness’, and thus unable 
to identify as such. This led many of these individuals to find refuge in an alternative identity, 
for some, this was their religious identity32. It is arguable that consequentially, in a society 
which is highly suspicious of outward displays of religious identity, French laïcité has, in 
correlation with a rise in Islamophobic attitudes, contributed to the ostracism of French 
Muslims. Ostracism can be defined as the act of “being ignored and excluded”, often occurring 
“without excessive explanation or explicit negative attention.”33 It can refer to individual or 
group exclusion “or a group of people being excluded, with a single person or a group excluding 
them.”34 Significantly, ostracism “is often operationalised as an unfolding sequence of 
responses endured while being ignored and excluded.”35 Thus, it can be understood as a 
process, a sequence of reactions, and one can expect the individual’s behaviour to change over 
time, whilst being subjected to apathy and exclusion. Ostracism has a notable effect on an 
individual’s identity-building, and this is particularly important in the consideration of French 
Muslims, as they battle with multiple identities. For acceptance by mainstream society, they 
must ‘become French’, yet they must also come to terms with their ethnic identity and their 
origins, and also identify with their religion. In the French context, laïcité plays a role in 
neutralizing the social sphere of civil society from displays of religious identity. Studies have 
shown that individuals often rely on a public and private identity, and that immigrants often 
have multiple identities, which help them to feel included and accepted in a variety of social 
settings. Thus, it is important to understand how being obliged to supress one’s identity is 
comparable to ostracism.  
Methodological Explanation 
The Thesis is qualitative and iterative, it uses both deductive and inductive approaches 
to theory and to research. Proceeding from the idea of path dependence, the methodology 
                                                             
31 King and Taylor, “The Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists,” 603. 
32 Saeed, “Media, Racism and Islamophobia”; Gould and Klor, “The Long-Run Effect of 9/11,” 2065. 
33 Williams, “Ostracism,” 429. 
34 Knapton, Holly M., “The Recruitment and Radicalisation of Western Citizens,” 39. 
35 Williams, “Ostracism,” 429. 
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chosen reflects a logical approach to the topic and to the treatment of the hypothesis. The choice 
of process tracing as an integral research method, and by association the structure of the thesis, 
should make evident the decisions which were taken in the planning and execution of this 
project. It was clear from the outset that the case of homegrown terrorism and radicalisation in 
France would be chosen for the purpose of this research as it has unique cultural, historical and 
media relevance. Firstly, research was conducted on cases of terrorism which had been 
committed in 2015, including the notorious Charlie Hebdo and Bataclan attacks. Attention was 
then focused on the debate concerning laïcité in France today, which is considered one of the 
most important issues in contemporary France as it touches upon diverse and divisive subjects 
such as, but not limited to, religious diversity and religious tolerance, multiculturalism and 
secularism, and also French culture and identity. The case focuses therefore on the French 
Muslim population, immigrants and their children or grandchildren more precisely, and the 
circumstances under which some individuals may become attracted to extremist Islamist views, 
and become radicalised in the process. The case was chosen for its political importance, not 
only because this thesis challenges the conventional discourse on laïcité, but because of the 
current debate on terrorism, migration, and radicalisation in Europe. 
In addition to scholarly research of the literature, empirical field research was 
undertaken in Paris, France. This experience lasted approximately eight days in April 2017 
during which many conversations and in-depth discussions about the topic and the hypothesis 
occurred. Visits to both the Grand Mosquée de Paris (Grand Mosque of Paris) and the 
Rencontre Annuelle des Musulmans de France (Annual Meeting of French Muslims) were 
enriching, and the opportunity arose to speak to Imams, professors and researchers, as well as 
the President of the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (French Council of Muslim Faith), 
one of the two most important Islamic organisations in France. All individuals were extremely 
receptive of the ideas, concepts and the topic in general. The discussions prompted them to 
speak about laïcité, and Islam’s integration into the republic, as well as radicalisation of French 
Muslims. Although questions for a semi-structured interview had been prepared in advance, 
these people were unwilling to be recorded. The decision was taken to continue the discussions 
nonetheless, and lengthy, enlightening conversations were held. There was much agreement 
with the hypothesis that laïcité is a cause of some grievance for Muslims in France, who regret 
particularly not being able to wear religious garb to which they are accustomed and which for 
many people is a requirement in Islam. This is something which they believe should be so 
simple, but which is unnecessarily condemned by the very strict application of secularism in 
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the public sphere in France. They do not believe that secular laws target them directly, or at 
least do not want to express this overtly, however it is extremely regrettable to Muslims that 
they are affected to such an extent. 
This thesis uses process tracing as a methodological approach, within social science this 
attempts to trace links between possible causes and observed outcomes36. The researcher can 
use a variety of qualitative sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or 
implies in a case is in fact evident in the pattern and values of the variables which occur in that 
case. It is possible therefore to identify patterns which the theory may evidently or implicitly 
imply. The suitability of this method for the thesis is that this approach is applicable to particular 
historical cases and takes into account the sequential processes within the case rather than on 
correlations of data across cases. It is therefore sufficient to focus in-depth on one case, that of 
French Muslims, rather than to look for correlations between cases in for example, in the United 
States, Britain, Holland and France. 
Within the thesis causal mechanisms, which are, according to the scientific realist 
school, “independent stable factors that under certain conditions link causes to effects”37 are 
essential for clarification of the effects. Process-tracing can be used in case studies to either 
uncover evidence of these mechanisms at work or to explain the outcomes. Vigilance is required 
as these factors operate only under certain conditions, however, this allows the consideration 
of many contextual and intervening variables. Conducting the research, one must avoid 
confirming necessity or sufficiency of an argument and remain open to alternative possibilities. 
It is also essential to consider the connection of a variable to conjunctions of variables that may 
themselves be necessary or sufficient for an outcome. Therefore, in this thesis, laïcité may not 
be necessary in leading to feelings of ostracism, discrimination, identity crisis… but there is a 
relationship. 
Let us assume that variable A (laïcité) leads to Y (radicalization) only in conjunction 
with B and C (ostracism, discrimination). Assume further that the conjunction ABC is sufficient 
for Y, and that the conjunction BC cannot cause Y in the absence of A. In this instance, A is a 
necessary part of a conjunction that is sufficient for the outcome Y. Many different 
combinations of relationships, dependencies, necessity and sufficiency are possible. If 
equifinality is present, and the conjunction ABC itself is not necessary for the outcome Y, it 
                                                             
36 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 147. 
37 George and Bennett, 8. 
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will be evident that this might arise through another combination that has nothing in common 
with ABC. This may in fact be the case, and as shall be demonstrated, there are multiple paths 
to radicalisation. 
It is not possible to resolve whether a causal condition identified as contributing to the 
explanation of a case is a necessary condition for that case, for the type of case that it represents, 
or for the outcome in general. It is possible however to accept a plausible claim that the presence 
of a variable ‘favours’ the results or is a ‘contributing cause’38, which could be a necessary 
condition, or not. Process tracing evidence and congruence (agreement/compatibility) tests 
shall provide useful evidence on determining relative weights for variables (such as variable A, 
described above) in a single case or in a small number of cases.  
On the question of representativeness, it shall not be possible to select cases that are 
directly representative of the entire French Muslim population, due to its extreme diversity, and 
the difficulty in studying groups of the population in any case due to the lack of a census on 
religious affiliation, which is French policy. It will also be impossible to claim that the findings 
from the research are applicable to this category of the population unless in contingent ways. 
Ergo, this research is only applicable to French Muslims when the independent variables are 
present. The goal of the research is to establish cumulatively contingent generalisations, in other 
words, a precise overview of the contingencies which apply specifically to the case of French 
Muslims shall be outlined. 
It is widely stated that case study researchers are more interested in revealing the 
conditions under which a specified outcome occurs, and the processes through which they 
occur, rather than the frequency with which they arise. For this thesis, cases have been selected 
with the goal of providing the strongest possible implication on the theory, which are cases 
where the variables are at extreme values and the contributory mechanisms are distinctly 
evident. Deviant cases can be used to identify left-out variables. Further research could study 
contingent generalisations which apply to subclasses of cases similar to those in my research, 
other religious minorities for example. Additional mechanisms which may not be so evident in 
the present research could be uncovered in cases that have less extreme weight on the pertinent 
variables such as, in less secular fundamentalist societies. The research and methods therefore 
have a certain degree of transferability and replicability.39  
                                                             
38 George and Bennett, 27. 
39 Bryman, Social Research Methods, 47. 
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The objective of the research is not to make bold statements about the effect of French 
secularist policies on the Muslim French community, but to investigate the contingencies, 
relationships, and assumptions of the theory. Thus far, only probabilistic or indeterminate 
predictions can be made. Effort will be made to demonstrate that alternative explanations for 
the radicalisation of French Muslims have been seriously considered to avoid providing the 
basis for a suspicion of ‘imposing’ a favoured theory or hypothesis as the explanation. This is 
complicated as the reader could suppose that cases are selected based on assumptions or through 
intense commitment to the hypothesis. The challenge will be to reconcile conflicting 
interpretations, or to choose between them wisely. This type of challenge arises as the 
explanation provided differs from earlier scholars, but the superiority of this innovative 
interpretation cannot be proven outright. In this case, which explanation is correct? Or, are both 
explanations part of the overall explanation? Demonstration of the variety of explanations 
occurs in chapters Two and Three, where other socio-psychological mechanisms are considered 
independently and, where applicable, in support of the hypothesis.  Where the data or 
generalisations available do not permit a choice between competing explanations, all of these 
shall be held as equally possible and the implications of all the possible explanations for the 
development of the theory shall be considered. The structure of the thesis should emphasise the 
importance of my research; the historical approach, theoretical explanation, and the empirical 
investigations are all indispensable for supporting my theory-oriented analysis and each step is 
necessary for readers not already familiar with the case to comprehend the investigation. 
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Chapter I: Historical Chronicle 
Chapter One provides the essential historical and conceptual background by tracing the 
evolution of laïcité, and outlines issues concerning the relationship of religion and state, as well 
as those related to the integration of Islam into French civil society. Finally, it introduces key 
concepts concerning radicalisation of French Muslims including the phenomenon of 
homegrown terrorism, with respect to how these relate to my hypothesis. The historical 
background focuses on two time-frames, each with their own significance for the research. The 
first, from 1905 and 2004, corresponds to the period between the year in which laïcité was 
established in France, and the year in which the ban on conspicuous religious signs and symbols 
in French public schools was passed. This period is key for reaching an understanding of laïcité, 
as well as introducing issues concerning the sedentism40 of immigrants in France, their 
integration, and that of Islam as well. This introduces several contentious debates including 
those of immigration, citizenship and identity in France, these shall be tackled briefly in this 
context but shall be examined in more depth in the main body of the research. Part Two studies 
the period between 2004 and 2015, from the year of the enactment of the law banning 
ostentatious religious symbols, to the year of the disastrous terrorist attacks in Paris. This period 
specifically relates to a turbulent period of recent French history during which Western 
countries in general became more sensitive to the Islamic religion. It is important to historically 
ground the susceptibility to radicalisation hypothesis and present the conditions and the case 
succinctly. From the outset, a theoretically based historical explanation of the case of religious 
tolerance and most significantly of Islam in France is provided, following which each 
significant step toward the outcome is explained by reference to a theory. Finally, the Chapter 
looks at the French experience with terrorism in the history of the Republic, including the 
contemporary phenomenon of homegrown terrorism.   
Part I: A Period of Adjustment (1905-2004) 
French Twentieth Century history has been particularly agitated concerning laïcité, in 
particular with the accommodation of Islam. This paper focuses on the way in which the French 
Muslims can, and do, practice their religion and express their religious identity in the context 
of French laïcité. Comprehensive discussion of issues concerning the Islamic faith in France 
necessitates revision of the content of the 1905 law, of which Article one states: “The Republic 
ensures freedom of conscience. It guarantees freedom of worship limited only by the following 
                                                             
40 Sedentism: the state of living in one place permanently. 
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rules in the interest of public order.”41 The clause ‘in the interest of public order’ has been 
widely criticised and debated, it is also significant for the present research. The law further 
separates state and church: “The Republic neither acknowledges, nor pays for, nor subsidises 
any form of worship.”42 Exceptions were made however for the provision of chaplaincies to 
ensure freedom of worship in public institutions such as hospitals, prisons, upper-high and high 
schools43. The remaining Articles of the law concern the distribution of goods, pensions and 
properties. Although all religious associations henceforth became subject to private law, the 
distinction between the private and the public sphere is not clearly defined in what concerns 
laïcité. The distinction is central to the contemporary debate on the application of laïcité. It is 
possible to distinguish between the private sphere, relating to families, and to individuals, as 
well as the public and social sphere of ‘civil society’ and finally the public and civic sphere of 
the state, relative to law and legislature44. It is widely acknowledged that religion has its place 
in the first two spheres, however it is excluded from the third sphere in order to respect the 
principle of neutrality of the state towards religion, and also to ensure that religion does not 
influence the functioning of the state.  
The separation between church and state needs further explanation, as this separation is 
not so self-evident. The state still intervenes continuously in matters of religion, which is hugely 
contested on the very basis of the principles of the law separating the church and state, and the 
distinction of three spheres of influence as stated above. Raphael Liogier, French sociologist 
and director of the ‘Observatoire du religieux’, states that “France happens to be in fact one of 
the European states which interferes the most frequently in religious matters.” 45 By studying 
the discussions on the manipulation of laïcité and the restrictions it places on the practice and 
expression of religion, it becomes clear that in contemporary France, terms are often 
contradictory. Religious equality is central to the state’s approach to its relationship with the 
church; Salton, professor at Aberystwyth, equates this with religious tolerance, and states that 
“a situation of laïcité without religious tolerance would be contradictory as it would betray the 
spirit of the 1905 law and of French constitutional law.”46 Salton also makes an insightful 
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contribution to the well-developed discourse on laïcité by making the necessary distinction 
between hostility, indifference and neutrality to religion.47 
The distinctive approach of ‘neutrality to religion’ is essential for understanding the way 
in which laïcité is conceptualised nowadays. The law of 1905, by assuring freedom of 
conscience and the separation of church and state, assumes not indifference but impartiality or 
neutrality of the state towards religion, however this is also a matter of contention. Michel 
Troper, professor at Université de Paris, has succinctly summarised the contradiction in one 
question, “Do secularism and neutrality consist of allowing all values to be expressed or 
propagating neutrality as a value?”48 This indeed leads one to question whether it is the people 
who are supposed to remain neutral to religion, or whether it is the public and social sphere 
which is intended to be neutral, and allow for religious plurality? Neutrality has come to be 
understood, however, as the need for a neutral public and social sphere, thus attempts at 
neutralising this space began in 1936 with the banning of all types of propaganda, political or 
religious, as well as proselytizing, at schools49. Following this, in respect to pluralism and the 
principle of neutrality, students’ freedom of expression was defended in the ‘Jospin law’50. 
Students were assured the right to wear ‘discrete religious signs’, however all conspicuous 
religious signs were banned. This was institutionalised in 1994 by the ‘Bayrou Circular’. The 
document, addressed to rectors, academy inspectors, departmental managing directors of 
national education, and headmasters, advised them to ban religious signs which could count as 
proselytising, those which would endanger the security of the students, as well as those which 
might disturb the pleasant atmosphere in the classroom51. Thus, towards the end of the twentieth 
century, the state was already prepared to restrict peoples’ expression of their religious beliefs 
within the public and social sphere. These developments have prompted a debate on whether 
the state is misunderstanding or even subverting the laws relating to laïcité, and it is to this 
debate that we shall now turn. 
In the later twentieth and the early twenty first centuries, there was a perception in 
French society of there being a revival of religious identities52. Whether real or perceived, this 
development was of particular importance concerning the integration of Islam into society, 
which had become increasingly visible from the 1970s onwards. This is partly due to the recent 
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ending of the decolonisation process in North Africa, especially the end of the long, costly war 
of independence in Algeria, in 196253. Arriving in France during the ‘Trente Glorieuses’, the 
first migratory flow was encouraged as France was lacking the manpower necessary for national 
reconstruction following the end of the Second World War54. Subsequent migration reunited 
families with their husbands, fathers and brothers now installed in France. As Habermas has 
noted, immigration and “the Muslims next door force the Christian citizens to face up to the 
practice of a rival faith. And they also give the secular citizens a keener consciousness of the 
phenomenon of the public space of religion.”55 Habermas argues that the political community 
must be opened up to the participation of foreign minority cultures, and that this is essential in 
promoting affiliation to their adoptive homeland, as well as with their integration into the public 
sphere.56  
Laïcité and its principles, when understood correctly, should be a strong defence for 
minorities against all forms of discrimination, and an affirmation of equality.57 The difficulty 
of integration and the political consequences became visible in the late 1980s, particularly the 
image of the Arabs confronting the values of the Republic, an image spearheaded by Jean-Marie 
le Pen.58 This image was due to the colonial legacy of the “Muslim-Arab-Maghrebin as 
belonging to a fundamentally inferior society, whose only hope was to merge with the host 
society, which had given him the short-lived boon of a job for wages.”59 It was during the same 
decade that strikes were organised by Muslim factory workers, who very publicly protested by 
praying in car-parks; by the end of the decade efforts were being made to reduce the visibility 
of Islam in France. In the 1980s, projects were initiated to facilitate the integration of Islam into 
French society, beginning with the establishment of the Conseil Représentatif de L’Islam en 
France (CORIF/Representative Council of Islam in France)60, and the Fédération National des 
Musulmans de France (FNMF/National Federation of French Muslims)61. Leading into the 
beginning of the 21st century, attempts were made to facilitate the integration of Islam in the 
Republic, resulting in the establishment of the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman 
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(CFCM/French Council of Muslim Faith), in 200362. However, contentions on the visibility of 
Islam in the public sphere and of the principles of laïcité persist well into the present day. 
There is perhaps no better example to illustrate the amalgamation of questions of 
integration of French Muslims, and thus of Islam in France, of religious identity, of national 
identity, of freedom of expression and of laïcité, than the question of the headscarf (hijab) in 
France. This debate has been widely documented, and its analysis is not the intention of this 
paper, however its importance merits mention. The headscarf is, as a visible sign of religious 
affiliation, precisely what prompted inquiries in France which, in the spirit of neutrality of the 
public sphere, have resulted in laws which impose important restrictions on the expression of 
religious identity for all faiths. Thus, in 2003 a Commission to investigate the ‘Application of 
the Principle of Secularity in the Republic’ was assembled; the resulting report became known 
as the ‘Stasi Report’, named after the Mediator of the Republic, and head of the Commission.63 
Within months of presenting the Report to then-President Jacques Chirac, a law forbidding 
wearing conspicuous religious symbols was passed by the National Assembly64. From 2004 
therefore, there was an increasing perception of victimisation on the part of French Muslims, 
who felt personally affronted by the law, and by the intensification of the application of the 
principles of laïcité. The ban was promoted as defending gender equality, and the secular nature 
of public schools, but criticised on “being based on an interpretation of laïcité that was neither 
philosophically necessary nor historically justified.”65 This distorted interpretation ultimately 
amounts to an exclusion, and not only from the public sphere, relating to the state, but also from 
civil society; this is what Daly refers to as the object of laïcité – “its object spilling over, 
increasingly, from the institutional to the social. This is evident in the legislative prohibition on 
‘conspicuous’ religious dress in public schools, in 2004, and on public face-veiling in 2010.” 66 
(emphasis in original). 
Part II: A Period of Escalation (2004-2015) 
The period between 2004 and 2015 is characterised by a region-wide increase in 
suspicion towards Muslims due to terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), which 
alerted Western society to the phenomenon of ‘homegrown’ terrorism. The concept of 
                                                             
62 Zeghal. 
63 O’Brien and Stasi, The Stasi Report. 
64 L’Assemblée Nationale et le Sénat, Loi encadrant, en application du principe de laicité, le port de signes ou de 
tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, colleges et lycées publics (1). 
65 Giry, “France and Its Muslims,” 92. 
66 Daly, “The Ambiguous Reach of Constitutional Secularism in Republican France,” 587. 
18 
 
terrorism, including ‘homegrown terrorism’ is addressed in greater depth in the following part 
of this Chapter. The 2004 law acted as a break with history as French citizens began to come to 
terms with, among others, the fact that Islam had become the second-most practiced religion in 
France. This had been facilitated by the sedentism of French Muslims whose integration into 
French society had been a significant obstacle due primarily to the colonial legacy felt by both 
the French and the immigrants and, notably, because of an intensification of the application of 
laïcité. Daly argues that this animosity and intensification is due to a “revived apprehension of 
deep religious identities” and “underlies the motivation to project constitutional secularism into 
juridically private contexts.”67 
The study of this period is particularly interesting for understanding issues which concern 
the integration of French Muslims into civil society, including the integration of Islam into the 
French public sphere. This discussion has a great bearing on individuals’ identities in France, 
not only of national identity, but of self-identification in particular. In 2005, urban riots broke 
out in suburban areas of 200 French cities68. In a Parisian suburb, two youths died by 
electrocution while hiding from police. The deaths prompted rapid spread of rioting across 
France, causing unprecedented disorder and violence which brought social scientists and 
political commentators face to face with the debate on identity, citizenship, and social inequality 
in French society. The most important conclusions drawn were those concerning the treatment 
of minorities and their perceived discrimination and stigmatisation. President Sarkozy, voted 
president of the Union Pour un Mouvement Popluaire (UMP/Union for a Popular Movement) 
in 2004, tackled the issue by stating that “France’s integration strategies ‘have failed’”; he also 
“introduced ‘obligatory interaction contracts’ for migrants that heavily focus on assimilation, 
including language and culture requirements for long-term (ten-year) resident permits.”69 These 
statements brought into question French Republican citizenship and democracy, and in 
particular the treatment of religious minorities. Furthermore, to draw on aforementioned 
arguments on neutrality, Daly has also pointed out that as a result of the, 
 “rightward-leaning, nationalist and exclusionary political discourse that gained 
traction during Sarkozy’s Presidency, under threat from the National Front, laïcité 
has outgrown its republican and liberal ethos to be appropriated as a disciplinary 
tool for ‘ostentatious’ displays of religious difference in the public square.”70  
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Thus, although one may not immediately recognise the interconnectedness of discussions on 
citizenship, integration, discrimination, laïcité, and political activism, demonstrated by the 
discussions above, there could in fact be more adjoining these issues than might be apparent. 
The political climate in the first decade of the 2000s was one of increased tensions, due 
to an evident rise in cases of homegrown Islamic terrorism in Europe, but also of anti-Muslim 
sentiment, particularly since the attack on the American Twin Towers in 200171. Horrific 
attacks took place in Madrid and London72, and it was these in particular which drew our 
attention to the phenomenon of homegrown Islamic terrorism in Europe. In 2015 France 
suffered a series of serious, and deadly, terrorist attacks including shootings, stabbings, a 
beheading, hostage takings and suicide bombings73, some of which were the most devastating 
to have been carried out on its mainland since the Algerian War. The most notorious of these 
attacks were the ‘Charlie Hebdo’ and the ‘November 2015 Paris Attacks’. The magnitude and 
frequency of the attacks will have lasting implications for the Muslims in Europe and have 
already given rise to stigmatisation74. 
Many authors have referred to the French Revolution as a turning point in the history of 
Europe regarding political violence and the relationship between the State and society75. The 
popular claim to governance, the ideologies involved, and the methods of political opposition 
utilised would, from then onwards, allow categorisation of terrorism as “an evolving complex 
of forces in civilian zones of violent combat over control of state power between officials in 
government and insurgents in society”76. For more than a century following the Revolution, 
until the establishment of the Third Republic, and indeed well into the early twentieth century, 
French politics and ideas appear to have  been carried out within a ‘battlefield’ concerning 
“struggles over the place of religion in France, over youth and education, over the nature of the 
socialist movement, over the very identity of the Third Republic.”77 Gregory Shaya, Professor 
at the College of Wooster, has studied the case of French anarchist-terrorists in the context of 
the late nineteenth century France, during which “a string of anarchist bomb attacks set off a 
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tumultuous debate”. Similar to the way in which contemporary terrorist attacks are treated, “this 
debate inquired obsessively into the nature of a homegrown threat to society.”78 Shaya’s study 
of homegrown terrorism also considers psychological approaches to understanding the pathway 
to terrorism.  
As mentioned previously, the increase in ‘homegrown’ terrorist attacks, whether 
attempted or in fact carried out, is an important factor to consider when discussing the treatment 
or integration of European Muslims. Gilles Kepel79, widely acknowledged as being the 
progenitor of the ‘conventional wisdom’ on radicalisation in France, in discussing the case of 
domestic radicalisation of British Muslims, declared ‘the solution’ “is the wholesale adoption 
of the French model of ‘radical secularism’”, which he claims, is the reason why France has 
(or, had) not suffered from terrorist attacks.80 He argued that France remained untouched 
because of the success of its assimilationist policies and the strength of its secularity, which 
require immigrants to adopt French language and customs, manners and dress, to acquire 
French tastes, and to adapt to French culture. There are no hyphenated identities in France of 
the type you might find in other Western multicultural societies such as British-Asian or British-
Muslim, African-American, etcetera. It is possible to say that in the twenty-first century, it has 
become increasingly evident that French society is in the midst of an identity crisis, with more 
and more interrogations on what constitutes French national identity, particularly in the last 
decade. 
Kunst, expert in social, personality and experimental psychology, has researched how 
stigmatisation due to religious beliefs can affect the identity formation of Muslims living in 
Western societies that are wary of Islam81. Additional studies developed the ‘Integrated Threat 
Theory’ which defines negative associations of Islam in society with the perception of Muslims 
and Islam as “a realistic threat (i.e., a threat to the very existence of the perceiver)”, or as “the 
perception of Muslims and Islam as a symbolic threat (i.e., a threat towards the perceivers’ 
values).”82 How the French Muslims perceive their situation is equally as important as the way 
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in which French Muslims are perceived by mainstream society. It is arguable that the rise in 
homegrown terrorism has altered the French peoples’ perceptions of Islam, and of French 
Muslims. Results of polls and surveys carried out in France are easily misleading, such as one 
completed by the Pew Research Centre published in January 2015, which points optimistically 
towards the French as holding the most favourable views of both Jews and Muslims when 
compared to six other European countries. “Indeed, 89% of French adults held favourable views 
of Jews, while 72% felt similarly about Muslims”, indicating that there is wider tolerance of 
religious diversity in France than might be expected.83 In reality however, alternative studies 
have shown a rise in hate crimes towards the followers of these religions but predominantly 
Muslims, and particularly in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack84. 
French Muslims perceive their situation as having to choose between their religious or 
their national identity, even though they may identify with both, which is a cause of widespread 
frustration within the Islamic community in France. Muslims therefore assimilate to Western 
values and take on the national identity of their host country, or else feel at risk of ostracism by 
mainstream society, as well as becoming the victims of racial discrimination and 
Islamophobia85. Saeed, expert in media theory, proposes that “such treatment may result in 
individuals believing that they must either reject their Muslim faith, or risk being rejected by 
mainstream society.”86 Chapter Two elaborates in greater detail as to the importance of 
perceptions of an individual’s status as they stand, and relatively, in comparison to the 
mainstream society. As Raphael Liogier has discussed extensively, perceptions and the 
‘structure of the cognitive field’ is to do with how we conceive ideas about one another. His 
discussion on this topic is focused on the visibility of religious symbols in the public square; he 
argues that:  
“We think we see things passively, when the very way in which we distinguish them 
cognitively (excluding, including, hierarchically arranging, emphasising certain 
parts of reality in our perception to the detriment of others) is correlated with the 
way in which we distinguish them socially (excluding, including, hierarchically 
arranging, emphasizing certain parts of the population, of certain activities)”87.  
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Therefore, it is possible to deduce that the terrorist activities of certain French Muslims would 
be associated with the wider French Muslim community, altering the way in which we 
distinguish them cognitively and consequentially, socially. This could possibly have led to, 
once again, the necessity to remove the visibility of religious identity from French civil society, 
this time by passing a law banning the burqa, the ‘head-to-foot-veil’, in 201188. 
This Chapter has laid out the historical and conceptual basis for theoretical exploration 
of the hypothesis in the following Chapter. The historical implications of laïcité in French 
society have been explored, particularly those concerning the integration of Muslim immigrants 
and their religion. The second part of the Chapter established France’s past and contemporary 
experiences with the phenomenon of homegrown terrorism. The analysis begins to demonstrate 
potential correlational relationships between laïcité and homegrown Islamist radicalization. 
The following Chapter studies terrorism from a socio-psychological perspective, thus the 
concepts elaborated here provide a basis for a more detailed discussion on theories of 
psychology of terrorism, and their application to the case of homegrown Islamist radicalisation 
in France.  
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Chapter II: Psychology of Terrorism and Radicalisation en France 
Chapter Two provides an overview of the field of the psychology of terrorism and 
identifies the specific independent variables for the hypothesis. Although it is impossible to get 
inside another’s mind, successful attempts at analysing psychological characteristics of 
terrorists have been made. A selection of studies undertaken by leading psychologists and 
psychiatrists are examined in order to familiarise the reader with research founded on 
psychoanalytical bases. Part One of the Chapter emphasises the importance of this approach to 
the study of homegrown Islamist radicalisation by examining relevant psychoanalytical studies 
of terrorism and receptiveness to radicalisation. Finally, it assesses the hypothesis against five 
renowned models and pathways to radicalisation, with a specific focus on homegrown 
radicalisation in order to observe whether laïcité can be a precursor to, or a mechanism within, 
the causal patterns brought forward by each theoretician. Part Two discusses how the 
independent variables of ostracism, discrimination, integration, identity and religion operate 
individually, and in conjunction with one another, to provide contingent generalisations on how 
and under what conditions they affect the dependent variable of French Muslims and contribute 
to their radicalisation. The aim of this kind of examination is to identify where laïcité may 
feature in the radicalisation process of French Muslims and should make it possible to determine 
the conditions under which the contingencies occur. The discussion highlights the importance 
of interdisciplinarity in studying radicalisation of Muslims in the West. Through deeper 
understanding of the processes of radicalisation, combined with a psychological approach to 
this, and a focus on sociological contributory factors, socio-psychological factors related to the 
radicalisation of French Muslims are identified. 
Part I: Psychological Studies 
Concerning the many studies which have been carried out in an effort to analyse the 
‘terrorist personality’, psychologists have focused their studies on the mental state of the 
individuals who had committed terrorist acts89. Much of the research focuses on 
psychopathology, aggression and narcissism90. There is little consensus on these personality 
types, however these studies have nonetheless contributed to today’s ‘conventional wisdom’ on 
terrorist personalities. John Horgan, professor of Global Studies and Psychology, Georgia State 
University, criticises previous studies on the topic for assigning a psychological affliction to 
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the perpetrator of the attack without having been able to conduct an examination with the 
outcome being a psychiatric diagnosis, stating that “there is poor evidence for the principle that 
psychopathy is an element of the psychology of terrorist organisations.”91 Marta Crenshaw’s 
study on West German terrorists from the 1970s founds her theory that “certain emotional 
deficiencies blind narcissists to the negative consequences of their actions.” Within her study, 
she quotes Lee Bollinger (President of Columbia University) who carried out research 
personally with terrorists:  
“The terrorists he interviewed demonstrated a feature characteristic of individuals 
with narcissistic and borderline personalities – splitting. He found that they had split 
off the de-valued parts of themselves and projected them onto the establishment 
which then became the target of their violent aggression.”92  
Within his investigation, Horgan studies the ‘Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis’, as 
developed by multiple authors, who focused their attention on minority groups and movements 
within society whose demands were to change the society they lived in. He explores how, and 
under what circumstances, these groups turn to violence, and what might cause its escalation. 
The adherence to this kind of group and participation in violence is a result of “a real or 
imagined underprivileged, disadvantaged status as an aggressive response from a failure to have 
their grievances resolved.”93 Some authors refer to many other characteristics, such as 
frustration or lack of goal attainment, which are still salient in contemporary studies. These 
theories still provoke the same critique, particularly that this still does not explain motivations 
for aggressive behaviour; in other words, it is still not possible to predict which individual will 
commit a terrorist attack. Criticism of attempts at terrorist profiling also arise considering the 
transferability of the theories from the individual to the group level: whereas these may be 
applicable to individuals (if still unverifiable), they lack validity at the group or collective 
level.94 What is for sure is that there is more of a mind-maze than a mind-map when attempting 
to comprehend the terrorist mentality. 
Analysing the Terrorist Identity 
In the late twentieth century, many more attempts at developing similar theories were 
undertaken in Europe, this time focusing on characteristics of the individuals, to which it is 
necessary to pay particular attention. These theories studied the inclination of ‘intellectuals’ 
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and ‘affluent youth’ and their motivations to change the society within which they lived; their 
motivations of course vary, however the demand for social change is paramount as it is “based 
on the frustrating conditions of conflicting social climates which… give rise to terrorism and 
extremism.”95 This factor is investigated in greater depth in the following section as this is 
indispensable in the theory of susceptibility to radicalisation of French Muslims. 
Psychodynamic, or psychoanalytic accounts, it has been admitted within the field, have 
limited saliency in the study of terrorism nowadays, however several scholars utilised methods 
associated with psychoanalysis in an attempt to draw out a terrorist ‘identity’.96 Horgan refers 
in particular to Erikson’s 1968 ‘personality theory’ which “suggests that the formation of an 
‘identity’ (and soon after, ‘negative’ identity) is crucial to personality development.”97 Others 
have contributed to the development of this theory by adding the dimension of ‘belonging’ to a 
group, thus association and collectiveness becomes an element in the identity building of the 
terrorist.98 It is possible to deduce that identity formation and a sense of group belonging are 
extremely important factors for these individuals, and that characteristically, the lack of a clear 
identity, or of acceptance within a group, can cause disruptions to that individual’s personality 
development. 
The study of intellectuals and ‘affluent youth’ have been associated with studies on the 
apparent normality of terrorists; these studies stress the absence of evidence to support the 
previous studies, and therefore of any psychological abnormalities. Some scholars link these 
observations to intelligence, openness, education, and preparedness, also stating the difference 
between non-political and political murderers, “the politically motivated killers generally came 
from more stable backgrounds and the incidence of psychological disturbance was much less 
than in the ‘ordinary criminals’.”99  
These studies and theories have contributed to the vast efforts which have been made 
in understanding terrorist psychology, although motivations are difficult to define, as well as 
their identity. Radicalised individuals will not always commit to terrorism, and the causes of 
terrorism are still misunderstood, if indeed understood at all. This certainly does not deny any 
importance to the research which has been carried out in this domain. 
                                                             
95 John Horgan, 11. 
See also: Kampf, 1990; Birrell, 1972; Friedland, 1992 and Heskin 1980, 1984 
96 John Horgan, 15. 
97 John Horgan, 15. 
98 Ibid. See also: Post; Kaplan and Cairns, 1981, 1989 
99 John Horgan, “Terrorists, Victims, and Society,” 15. 
26 
 
Receptiveness to Radicalism 
As can be deduced from these observations, the individual is incredibly difficult to 
characterise. Likewise, Andrew Silke, forensic psychologist and Honorary Senior Research 
Associate of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of 
St Andrews, admits the difficulty in defining the terrorist groups, and even what a ‘terrorist’ is. 
Silke affirms that groups vary in ideology, size, influence (reach), tactics and methods. 
Significantly for my research, he studies marginalisation and discrimination with the goal of 
identifying receptiveness to radical ideologies, stating:  
“if marginalised groups are discriminated against or internal sections believe that 
there is discrimination, there will always be those within such communities who 
will be receptive to radical ideologies advocating changing or reforming the 
established, mainstream social system.”100  
Whilst the importance of discrimination as a cause of marginalisation is acknowledged, Silke 
admits that this is still insufficient for pushing an individual to commit acts of terrorism, an 
important feature to consider when studying susceptibility to radicalisation.  
In addition to these topographies, Jerrold Post, professor of Psychiatry, Political 
Psychology and International Affairs at George Washington University, and founding director 
of the CIA Centre for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behaviour, includes the 
generational factor, claiming that there is “an increased radicalisation and recruitment of 
terrorists from second-and third-generation émigrés to the global Salafi jihad.”101 He explains 
how barriers to integration and day-to-day difficulties concerning discrimination and other 
experiences pertaining to the social conditions of Muslim immigrants in Europe “promoted 
feelings of alienation among young Muslims who felt excluded from the rigid European social 
structure.”102 Post identifies the individuals as not initially being overtly religious. Searching 
for a “companionship, acceptance, and a sense of meaning and significance” they will turn to 
religion, and eventually this will make them “vulnerable to extremist religious leaders and their 
radicalisation within Muslim institutions.” 103 Although there is not one established path to 
radicalisation, the features identified here are pertinent for the present research and the 
investigations in the following section.  
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Models and Pathways to Radicalisation 
Five models have been chosen for investigation here, as previously selected for a study 
by Michael King and Donald Taylor of the Department of Psychology at McGill University. 
Their review of these five models is particularly relevant and, as experienced psychologists, 
they provide a scientifically sound basis to draw conclusions from their observations of 
psychological factors, which have been brought forward previously as contributing to 
radicalisation. The psychological factors which they hold to be most important in their analysis 
as contributing to the radicalisation process are: “group relative deprivation, identity conflicts, 
and personality characteristics.”104 Assessment of these five models is used to determine if, and 
when, laïcité contributes to the process of radicalisation of French Muslims.  
The first model for investigation is that of Randy Borum, forensic psychologist and 
associate professor at the Department of Mental Health Law and Policy at University of South 
Florida, which has been classified as a ‘linear and progressive’ model. The stages and factors 
involved in here are: social and economic deprivation, inequality and resentment, blame and 
attribution, and finally, stereotyping and demonising the enemy105. Borum explains his model 
as being initiated by deprivations, either “economic (e.g., poverty, unemployment, poor living 
conditions) or social (e.g., government-imposed restrictions on individual freedoms, lack of 
order or morality).”106 He continues that, the more the individual perceives their situation as an 
‘injustice’, the more they will create for themselves a sense of relative deprivation, and gives 
the example of Middle Eastern peoples compared to citizens of the United States, “a caricature 
of affluence and wasteful excess”107. Injustice, perceived or real, will lead an individual to place 
blame on the ‘outgroup’ which is held responsible for their “illegitimate situation”108. This is a 
key factor in the radicalisation process as only a minority of the ‘ingroup’ will pass from this 
mechanism to the legitimisation of violence against the outgroup. As has been discussed in the 
previous Chapter, laïcité is a policy which is held in great disdain by those individuals wishing 
for the freedom to express their religious identity within the public sphere of civil society in 
France, which is prohibited by law. The enforcement of the 1905 law of separation stipulates 
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that religion is a strictly private matter, the reinforcement of the law in 2003 by the Stasi Report 
and the banning of ‘ostentatious’ religious symbols the following year, which was perceived 
overwhelmingly as targeting the Muslim headscarf, are all factors which could prompt the first 
mechanism in this process of radicalisation which here, has been termed social deprivation. 
The second model analysed is that put forward by Wiktorowicz, expert on national 
security engagement and counter-terrorism, and former White House security advisor. This 
four-point model stresses socio-psychological factors from the outset. The first stage in this 
process is a ‘cognitive opening’, followed by ‘religious seeking’, ‘frame alignment’ and ending 
in ‘socialisation’109. According to Wiktorowicz, the cognitive opening is closely linked to 
‘seeking’ which, “shakes certitude in previously accepted beliefs”110, allowing for the cognitive 
opening to arise, and increasing the individual’s susceptibility to extremist interpretations. 
Although the author’s attention singularly focused on recruitment by the jihadist group from 
the United Kingdom, al-Mujahiroun, the theoretical framework and the model for radicalisation 
is indeed transferable to other national and organisational contexts. The sequence of stages in 
this model closely resembles the processes which shall be explored in the second Part of 
Chapter Two, which links the current enforcement of laïcité and the psychological processes of 
ostracism, which, as shall be demonstrated, leads eventually to radicalisation.  
The model developed by Moghaddam111 perceives radicalisation as a staircase that the 
individual climbs, leading to recruitment depending on particular circumstances, and ultimately 
enticing the individual to commit a terrorist act. The ladder consists of six steps, beginning with 
the individual’s ‘psychological interpretation of material conditions’, ‘perceived options to 
fight unfair treatment’, ‘displacement of aggression’, ‘moral engagement’, ‘solidification of 
categorical thinking’, leading ultimately to the sixth and final stage, ‘the terrorist act’.112 
Moghaddam also places considerable importance on the factor of relative deprivation, and 
couples this with perception of perpetual underachievement of the individual, or their 
insecurities, thus, injustice also features highly in the early stages in this model113. Moghaddam 
links his hypothesis to the psychology of intergroup relations114, again a central feature of those 
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explored earlier. Self-awareness and group relations, interaction and inclusion or exclusion are 
thus seen as prominent features in the hypothesis which identifies laïcité as a key determinant 
in the process of the radicalisation of French Muslims.  
The fourth model selected is that of Silber and Bhatt, two Senior Intelligence Analysts 
for the New York City Police Department (NYPD) Intelligence Division, whose study is 
particularly interesting for the present research as it is uniquely focused on homegrown Islamist 
radicalisation. Their model is also composed of a four-stage process, however interestingly the 
first stage in this case is termed ‘pre-radicalisation’, referring to “their life situation before they 
were exposed to and adopted jihadi-Salafi Islam as their own ideology.”115 This stage is 
followed then by ‘self-identification’, ‘indoctrination’ and ends in ‘jihadisation’. The authors’ 
study of radicalisation in the West suggests that this “often starts with individuals who are 
frustrated with their lives or with the politics of their home governments. These individuals 
ultimately seek other like-minded individuals and form a loose-knit group or social network.”116 
The link in the chain between the first and second stages is a ‘key driver’, which prompts the 
individual to turn to Islam in response to a personal crisis, which can include “losing a job, or 
the result of an ongoing situation, like discrimination or an identity crisis.”117 In France, 
political grievances linked to discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation can lead 
individuals to pass easily from the first to the second stage, whereby the individual seeks 
association with a larger ideological movement with which they can identify closely, and use 
to legitimise their behaviour from that point forward. 
The fifth model investigated is that of Sageman118, which interestingly is the only model 
classified as a non-linear process. The four factors contributing to this radicalisation process 
are ‘sense of moral outrage’, ‘frame used to interpret the world’, ‘resonance with personal 
experience’ and lastly, ‘mobilisation through networks’119. This model is reviewed as a 
combination of cognitive and situational factors, which do not have to occur in any specific 
order, however it is unclear whether all factors must be experienced in order for radicalisation 
to occur, or even whether all factors are of equal importance in the process. The two first-
mentioned factors in this model can be related to reactions to foreign policy, and to the Islamist 
extremist worldview of a war on Islam. The third is more personal, and Sageman identifies this 
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factor as being particular to the European situation, where Muslims are generally less well off 
than the average American Muslim family120. This could be perceived as a kind of relative 
deprivation, depending on the individual’s perception of their current situation, and could 
induce the individual to seek networks of likeminded individuals. Adherence to a group 
ideology is the fourth factor contributing to an individual’s radicalisation in this model and is 
the only non-cognitive factor. This is applicable to the situation of French Muslims ostracised 
on the basis of their religious identity, as described in the following section. They are typically 
seeking inclusion and a sense of belonging in a group, with an ideology which will fulfil their 
need for a meaningful existence. 
Part II: Susceptibility to Radicalisation  
This Part of the Chapter focuses on how some French Muslims struggle to live up to the 
assimilationist expectations of French mainstream society and suffer stigmatisation as a result. 
It is important to state here that this investigation does not conclude that this is the only reason 
for radicalisation of French Muslims, nor does it aim to say that French Muslims are not well 
integrated, nor that they all suffer stigmatisation, or that all stigmatised French Muslims will 
become radicalised. It is also paramount to keep in mind that there is only a very small minority 
who may become radicalised, and even fewer who may then go on to carry out terrorist acts. 
This research aims improve an understanding of the implications of the intensification of the 
application of French laïcité, how this can alter the psyche of French Muslims, and what role 
this plays in their radicalisation. 
Ostracism and Radicalisation of French Muslims 
The research indicates that feelings of rejection and ostracism could result in an 
increased risk of joining extremist terrorist groups. Studies on ostracism and its potential effects 
on an individual indicate that this can affect the self-esteem and a variety of emotions (such as 
sadness and anger), as well as feelings of belonging and meaningful existence121. In most cases, 
even if the group ostracising is despised, that is, regardless of the nature of the group ostracising, 
individuals will still be affected negatively by being excluded. Williams122 further points out 
that scholarly interest in ostracism and related phenomena, which in this case is homegrown 
Islamic radicalisation, is “linked to its association with horrific violent events.”123 He goes so 
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far as to say that this fact is not simply ‘correlational’, and that “ostracism, social exclusion, 
and rejection are causally linked to a reduction in prosocial behaviours and an increase in 
derogation of the excluder”124. This means that the individual shows less interest in seeking the 
attention of the excluder, and consequentially may then focus reprisals on them. Furthermore, 
the individual may display “antisocial behaviours to others who may or may not have been the 
source of exclusion.”125 Thus, one may deduce that the individual would not care about the 
collateral damage caused by their actions.126 It could be argued therefore that social isolation 
and the above negative attitudes play a role in triggering the planning of elaborate acts and 
committing violence.  
In the case of French Muslims, this features prominently and is manifested in the 
frustration of many individuals who are struggling with stigmatisation on the basis of their 
religious beliefs, and a sense of not ‘belonging’. The more difficult society makes it for an 
individual to feel involved, the more the individual will perceive this as exclusion, and 
stigmatisation; as “this is a behaviour that an individual cannot regulate, and in turn, this may 
affect their need for control and meaningfulness”127. Atoning for the loss of control and 
meaningfulness, individuals look for alternative groups, and in a state of frustration and lack of 
belonging, are highly influenceable; the group which they are attracted to generally has strong 
message content and persuasiveness, as well as coherent, as opposed to weak arguments128. 
Wood, expert in social behaviour, explains that individuals are highly perceptive of the attitudes 
around them and if in a weakened state, are more receptive to strong messages by stating that 
“attitudes are social phenomena… they emerge from and are embedded in social interaction.”129 
Thus, when French Muslims perceive themselves as being excluded from mainstream society, 
they will seek alternatives to compensate for their failure of acceptance. Furthermore, when 
individuals become more easily influenceable, they are likely to become more susceptible to 
radicalisation130. 
It has been established that laïcité dominates the social sphere of civil society and alters 
mainstream societies’ attitudes towards religious diversity and displays of religious identity 
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within this sphere. In combination with the subsequent stigmatisation of French Muslims, and 
their exclusion, this leads to an identity crisis on their part. In some cases, these individuals are 
more likely to strengthen their religious identity, when they perceive the attitude of mainstream 
society as rejection, and therefore as a failure on their part to ‘become French’131. One of the 
circumstances is their affiliation to a group or acceptance within a group, normally with a strong 
message and persuasiveness. In their vulnerable state of acute influenceability, the ostracised 
individual will become more susceptible to radicalisation. McCauley and Moskalenko have 
identified three levels of radicalisation132: individual, group and mass-public. They have also 
enumerated twelve mechanisms of political radicalisation which range within their three levels 
from individual to mass-public levels. The first step in their pathway to radicalisation at the 
individual level is ‘victimisation’133 as a result of which, “individuals may enter the path of 
personal radicalisation as a result of a desire for revenge”134. It is possible to deduce from these 
arguments that discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation amounts to ostracism, leading 
to a feeling of victimisation, which is the first mechanism of radicalisation at the individual 
level. The second mechanism identified in this process is ‘political grievance’ which is also a 
prominent feature in the case of France, and closely associated with the debate on laïcité. At 
this stage in the process, individuals act in response to what they perceive as discrimination or 
victimisation, and are likely to commit violent acts. The authors clarify that although this 
mechanism takes place at the individual level, the individual “is likely to have some association 
with a larger intellectual movement.”135 This is to suggest that at this point, an individual will 
have self-identified with a strong, persuasive argument by one or another group, and will begin 
to act according to the group ideology.  
As mentioned above, ostracism can lead to a feeling of lack of meaningfulness. This has 
implications on how an individual reacts to ostracism, since when they feel that their Muslim 
identity is under threat, as they may do for instance in a society which rejects public displays 
of religious identity, the need for assimilation is increased. Ostracism can affect an individual’s 
pro-social needs, such as need for belonging and self-esteem, as mentioned earlier. Several 
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arguments above have outlined however that when ostracised, they will identify more with their 
religious identity, particularly if they feel that it is threatened in some way, further increasing 
their likelihood of committing violent acts against the mainstream society136. Need for control 
and meaningful existence are examples of anti-social needs and are particularly pertinent and 
dangerous when considering group radicalisation, referring to the formation of a group by 
individuals as a result of social exclusion. Groups of this kind may encourage the development 
and escalation of their devotion.  
As noted in the previous section, there is little evidence for the mental instability of 
terrorists137 however, Post highlights the importance of groups of individuals who 
perceive themselves as victims of society and come together, stating: 
“the combination of the personal feelings of inadequacy with the reliance on the 
psychological mechanisms of externalisation and splitting leads them to find 
especially attractive a group of like-minded individuals whose credo is ‘It’s not us 
– its them; they are the cause of our problems.’”138  
It is in a group setting that individuals will tend towards one or another extreme on the spectrum 
of radical ideas supported by the group. Furthermore, individuals who seek inclusion and sense 
of belonging may increase their perception of the need to behave according to the group 
ideology, and therefore of justification of violence towards the group ostracising. This 
corresponds with the fifth and sixth mechanisms identified in the pathway to violence of 
McCauley and Moskalenko, which are: 5: Extremity shift in like-minded groups; and 6: 
Extreme cohesion under isolation and threat.139 These groups can develop into terrorist cells 
associated with transnational or international terrorist organisations such as al Qaeda or more 
recently, ISIS. This has been the case in France, and the identification and incarceration of the 
individuals involved in such groups is becoming more and more frequent, particularly since the 
series of attacks carried out on French territory in 2015.  
This Chapter has outlined some of the factors concerned with laïcité, including the 
politics of suppression of displays of religious affiliation and how this in turn can be termed a 
type of ostracism. By submitting the ‘susceptibility to radicalisation’ hypothesis to a 
psychological study, this Chapter has demonstrated how the process of ostracism develops 
parallel to processes of radicalisation of individuals and groups. Throughout the Chapter 
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arguments have been brought forward suggesting that laïcité contributes towards producing the 
social and psychological mechanisms of radicalization of French Muslims. The following 
Chapter cross-examines the findings against profiles of susceptible individuals and cases of 
French radicals having carried out deadly terrorist attacks in France. 
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Chapter III: Empirical Investigations: French homegrown Radicalisation 
This Chapter provides a complex empirical explanation of the combination of factors, 
variables and patterns identified above. The hypothesis is tested in two phases; the first 
investigates whether it is applicable to the groups most susceptible to Islamist radicalisation, 
namely prisoners, converts and students, and briefly addresses Internet radicalisation. These 
categories are identified as being the most vulnerable sections of society due to their isolation 
from society, their profile, and their youthfulness, respectively, and their influenceability, 
collectively. The second investigation looks at examples of French Muslim homegrown radicals 
who have committed terrorist acts on French territory. In particular, it focuses on the cases of 
the Charlie Hebdo (2015) attackers, the Kosher supermarket (2015) attacker, and the 
perpetrators of the November 15th, 2015 Paris attacks. Finally, the case of Mohammed Merah 
who committed the 2012 attacks in Toulouse and Montauban is examined. The results of this 
investigation aim to assess whether the empirical patterns match those predicted or implied by 
the theory. 
Investigation 1: Susceptible Individuals 
Prisoners  
Prisoners are not an unusual choice for studies of radicalisation, and their case cannot be 
overlooked in the study of homegrown Islamist terrorism in the French context. Rosenthal’s140 
2006 study on European Muslim convicted terrorists, their motivations and paths to 
radicalization focuses specifically on French Muslims. One imprisoned French Islamist had 
confessed:  
“I understood that I was different, that I was not French, that I would never become 
French and had no business trying to become French either. I took it well. I was 
proud of my new Muslim identity. That was my reconquest of myself, my burst of 
lucidity, my awakening… no more desire to become part of this France that did not 
want me.”141  
In his analysis of statements made by imprisoned European Muslims, Rosenthal argues that 
“hatred of France is the unifying thread running through the testimonials of the inmates and, …  
clearly provides the primordial affect that has fueled the process of their radicalization.”142 He 
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goes on to discuss the various motives including foreign policy, which can be classified as 
injustices that are indirectly felt143, and points out that it is “rather France that they hold 
accountable for perceived injustices that they have lived”144, (emphasis in original) which, as 
has been made evident, other authors have also acknowledged in their assessment of this 
phenomenon. 
The number of Muslim prisoners in France hugely outnumbers those of other religions, 
they often account for more than 50 percent, and in some cases as high as 70 percent, of 
inmates145. Despite their high numbers little is done in France to accommodate them correctly 
within the prison facilities. This is particularly noticeable when their numbers are compared to 
the small number of Imams visiting prisons and available to prisoners across the French 
territory146. There are two major factors contributing to the inmates’ radicalisation, particularly: 
frustration over their perceived (or real) discrimination within the prison, often accused of as 
Islamophobic treatment, and adjoined to this, policies of laïcité which directly affect the 
inmates and the practice of their religion.  
Frustration alone is non-relatable to Islamic radicalisation, however within the prison 
context several factors related to religious practice allow some prisoners to connect their 
frustration to a desire for revenge, with reference to an extreme ideology. The lack of Imams is 
one important factor as noted by Khosrokhavar, professor at Ecole des Hautes Etudes en 
Sciences Sociales, in his in-depth study on radicalisation in French prisons; not being able to 
practice their religion as they would desire is a source of great frustration for the majority of 
Muslim inmates147. Policies of laïcité also reach within the prison, most importantly, a ban on 
“the expression of Islamic identity”148. French laïcité also affects the fulfilment of dietary 
requirements prescribed in Islam, as halal food is only provided on a private basis, which means 
that it must be purchased at the canteen rather than being readily available as a meal choice. 
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Admittedly, radicalisation in prisons takes place on a rather small scale149, however even its 
infrequent occurrence is not insignificant in this study. A new radicalisation process is observed 
within French prisons which depends on close-knit relationships typically between a ‘mentor’ 
and one or two, rarely more than three individuals; these types of cells, or ‘micro-groups’ are 
formed in prisons where tight bonds are more important than in the outside world.150 
Converts  
Concerning the radicalisation of individuals who chose to convert to the Muslim faith, 
reports have indicated that there is a growing threat of violent attacks from this group. It is 
estimated that in France there are somewhere between 50,000 to 100,000 Muslim converts, also 
referred to as New Muslims, of a total number of approximately 4 million Muslims151. This 
group is considered to be particularly vulnerable to succumbing to extremist ideologies because 
of their eagerness to embrace their new faith, and for this reason are seen as easy targets among 
European Muslims. The targeting of this group by recruiters is however due primarily to their 
profile, being usually white European, enhancing their ability to travel across borders with less 
suspicion on the part of the authorities compared to their Arab counterparts152. This is contrary 
to ideas spread by conventional wisdom on radicalisation of Western Muslims, which claims 
that the targeting of this group is due particularly to their lack of clear knowledge on Islam, 
which could endanger them from the outset to adhesion to an extremist interpretation.  
The radicalisation of New Muslims is extremely difficult to understand however, recent 
studies have made ground in this domain. Bartoswezicz, specialist in international security, 
conducted a study on European converts to Islam, and constructed a matrix of ‘conversion 
trajectories’ which emphasised the importance of ‘conversion stories’ or the individuals’ path 
to conversion, as well as the effect that conversion has on them following the act. This approach 
allowed her to establish a typology of New Muslims’ identities, as either Ambassador, Lost, 
Bridge or Castaway. These four typologies are more or less vulnerable to radicalisation 
depending on the circumstances under which they evolve, furthermore a convert is not limited 
to only one archetype and may change type as the environment and their behaviour are altered, 
depending on the extent of acceptance, rejection, inclusion or exclusion the individual 
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encounters153. The two most vulnerable archetypes are, predictably, Lost and Castaway154, 
although more surprisingly the Lost New Muslim is the more vulnerable according to 
Bartoswezicz’s typologies. This archetype also constitutes the most variable type, as there exists 
an “overabundance of highly personalised factors” contributing to build-up of this group155. 
Individuals who had for a period experienced this archetype confessed to their vulnerability as 
a New Muslim of falling into extremism, as they were aware that they were an easy target 
during the early stages of conversion. This fact, and others relating to their vulnerability are 
brought up by Karagiannis, expert in radicalisation and Islam, who has identified converts’ 
receptiveness to radical views156, among which personal victimisation and perceived grievances 
feature prominently, as they did for McCauley and Moskalenko157. 
Students and Youth  
As for the case of students and the French youth in general, there is a growing sentiment 
that their radicalisation is “one of the most important threats of international terrorism in the 
world today”158. In France fifteen to twenty-one-year-olds constitute the ‘youth’ and are 
understood here as the group most affected by radicalisation, concerning 63 percent of cases159. 
They are considered at high risk to radicalisation because of many factors which are mostly 
socio-psychological, although not necessarily applicable to all cases, but are identified in the 
majority of cases reported. Many of these factors are related to social exclusion, discrimination, 
and economic disparity. The factors relating more specifically to French youths are concerned 
with the family or their personal identity; the lack or absence of parental or family guidance 
can play a role, as well as the perception of their family’s history or religiosity160. Their 
vulnerability is increased by their opinion of the acceptance of Muslims in French civil society 
and their opportunities (or lack of) therein.  The category ‘youths’ can also refer to the ages 
fifteen to twenty-four, which merits studying in the case of France, if not insignificantly because 
of their comparatively high rate of unemployment compared to adult age groups; in 2012, their 
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unemployment rate reached a staggering 25.7 percent161. This is even more salient concerning 
French Muslims, as the unemployment rate of Muslim immigrants is approximately 12 percent, 
double that of immigrants from other origins (INSEE data)162.  
Many studies have been carried out concerning the radicalisation of French youths, 
attempting to establish a typology of the radicalisation process for this category. The stages of 
radicalisation typically coincide with a ‘cutting off’ in various senses of the term. The 
individual, preoccupied with their own purity eventually cuts himself, or herself, off from 
society, beginning with their immediate friendship group, pastimes, and eventually their 
studies. This is typically eventually followed, in much rarer and more extreme cases, by cutting 
off family ties, and the young individual may even decide to travel abroad once they have 
identified with one or another larger group ideology163. The involvement of parents and the 
community have been identified as the most important factors in identification of youth 
radicalisation; many signals are apparent during each stage of the radicalisation process which 
should be identifiable by friends, family and their immediate entourage164. The diversity of the 
composition of this age group attests to the equally numerous mechanisms playing a role in the 
radicalisation of French youth. 
One manner of radicalisation which is readily available and particularly utilised by the 
youth is online via the Internet. The first identifiable differences between offline and online 
radicalisation is the fact that technology offers users a high degree of anonymity, and 
information can be shared instantaneously and accessed by individuals or by groups, 
simultaneously165. A ‘Radicalisation Factor Model’ has been developed which considers the 
individual characteristics, context-specific information, technology usage, behavioural patterns, 
the means utilised, the usage of technology by radical groups, and extremist groups and 
ideologies. The authors of the model highlight the importance of four factors: “the 
characteristics of the radicalised individual, the environment, the radical groups and ideologies, 
and the technologies related to online radicalisation.”166 The framework serves as a basis on 
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which to understand the complexity of online radicalisation, which remains nonetheless highly 
intangible. As the narrative reads however, “No community should consider themselves 
immune from the global reach and connectivity of Islamist groups following in the footsteps of 
al Qa’ida.”167 This indicates that the threat of online radicalisation is prolific and many groups 
in society are vulnerable to falling victim to the spread of extremist ideas online.  
It is specifically the reach and the availability of information online which supports what 
is known as ‘self-radicalisation’, which is defined as “the radicalisation of individuals without 
direct input or encouragement from others”. Access to, and the dissemination of shared views, 
radical beliefs and ideas online is extremely difficult to regulate as the “Internet knows no 
geographical boundaries, thus creating a space for radical activists to connect to people across 
the globe.”168 The ‘activists’ demonstrate extremely sophisticated online behaviour, including 
the quantity and the content of online activity, their use of social media and the concealment of 
their true identity. Many methods exist however of ‘Web Mining’ which aim to target online 
radical profiles, using various techniques of ‘web harvesting’, and content, link and network 
analyses, as well as manual methods of analysis169. 
It becomes evident therefore that there are many groups in society vulnerable to 
radicalisation by very diverse means. This study has pointed out the weaknesses of certain 
groups and has laid out the typologies towards radicalisation but has also presented some means 
of prevention. It is possible to deduce from this brief analysis that the case of prisoners is the 
most country-specific considering the treatment of prisoners, specifically the policies of laïcité 
which reach within the prison facilities prohibiting the expression of Muslim identity. These 
policies severely restrict the free practice of the Islamic faith and cause intense frustration and 
a legitimate sense of being discriminated against when compared to other religions within the 
prison setting. Frustration alone was insufficient for allowing receptiveness of extremist 
ideologies, however the presence of a mentor and the formation of ‘cells’ within the prison 
facilities greatly increases the individual’s vulnerability to Islamist radicalisation. Last but not 
least, these individuals’ state of incarceration deprives them of the positive influences of family 
and the community; little interaction with alternative influences increases their susceptibility to 
feeling alienated from society. These are factors which were observed in the previous Chapter, 
indicating that laïcité may have an influence in the early stages of radicalisation. Having 
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examined the groups most vulnerable, the attention shall now turn to carefully selected profiles 
which provide an enriching investigation.  
Investigation 2: Profiles of French Radicals 
This section examines some empirical examples of cases of radicalised French Muslims 
who have committed violent terrorist attacks in France. These cases have been selected because 
they are contemporary, they are diverse, and they are illustrative of the complexities associated 
with the investigation of susceptibility to radicalisation. The first pair to be examined are Chérif 
and Said Kouachi, two brothers who, on the 7th January 2015 attacked the Charlie Hebdo 
offices, killing twelve people including eight journalists, two police officers, a caretaker and a 
visitor170. The brothers had very different profiles, however both underwent a long process of 
radicalisation, leading to their violent attack. Having lost both their parents at a young age, the 
brothers lived a relatively isolated adolescence in a foster home in a small village. They returned 
to Paris around 2000 where, following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the two began to frequent the 
Adda’wa Mosque, where they met individuals whose piety made an impression on them, one 
in particular, Mr Benyettou, taught them and other young men; the group would become known 
as the ‘Buttes-Chaumont’171. The following year, Chérif and Said began visiting Benyettou at 
his apartment where they discussed religious justification for suicide attacks, how to load bombs 
into trucks and attack American bases172.  
Chérif Kouachi was imprisoned in 2005 for nearly 20 months for attempting to leave 
France for Iraq. In prison, Chérif was exposed to intense Islamic resentment, and it was here 
that he met Djamel Beghal, one of France’s most radical jihadists, and top al Qaeda operative. 
Said Kouachi, who struggled to find full-time employment, also began to follow a strict 
interpretation of Islam, and his fundamentalist attitudes eventually cost him his job. Once 
released, Chérif and Said continued to contact Beghal, and another former inmate, Mr Coulibaly 
whose case is discussed following this173.  
The Kouachi brothers therefore fit into two of the three vulnerable profile types 
identified earlier in the Chapter, specifically, ‘prisoners’ and ‘youth’. It is clear that Chérif’s 
radicalisation was welded in prison due to his contact with Dhamel Beghal, and the personal 
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grievances174 he must have experienced during his incarceration. Said’s radicalisation is less 
clear, however the loss of the support of his younger brother, to whom he had always been 
extremely close, may have increased his influenceability and made him more vulnerable to 
succumbing to a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. His behaviour altered, causing his 
subsequent unemployment, which could have led his perception of his present situation to that 
of ‘relative deprivation’175 which is a recurrent factor in the models of radicalisation discussed 
above.  
The case of Amedy Coulibaly is closely related to that of the Kouachi brothers, as he 
declared that he was acting in order for the Kouachi brothers to be allowed to go free. Coulibaly 
took 19 people as hostages in a Kosher supermarket, Hyper Cacher in Porte de Vincennes in 
Paris, killing four before a siege was carried out and Coulibaly was shot down. The profile of 
Coulibaly is closest to that of a youth, and seems to have radicalised relatively quickly. It was 
in prison where he was described as a sheep and earned his nickname ‘Doly’, after the cloned 
animal176 and where his first encounters with fundamentalist Islam took place. Coulibaly met 
both Chérif Kouachi and Dhamel Beghal during his imprisonment in Fleury-Merogis prison in 
2006. He was shocked by the conditions under which they were kept, and apparently even 
filmed his living conditions along with four other inmates, sharing his videos with the press 
upon his release. Behavioural as well as clothing changes, new tastes in religious music, and 
alterations in his personal relationships, indicated stricter adherence to religion. 
Coulibaly continued to frequent Beghal and Kouachi who collectively were planning to 
break free another inmate convicted for life for terrorism.177 For this plot, Coulibaly was 
arrested and served a five-year prison sentence, and was freed in 2014. During the kosher 
supermarket hostage-taking, he is claimed to have shouted at the hostages “You will tell them 
they must stop, stop attacking the Islamic State, stop unveiling our women, stop imprisoning 
our brothers for no reason.”178 Evidently, political grievances were a strong motivation for his 
actions as well as a perception of discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation, both in 
terms of the treatment of women and the law enforcing them to remove their religious headgear, 
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and that of Muslim men who constitute a large percentage of inmates in French prisons. It could 
be argued that in this case, policies of laïcité feature as a motivational factor for commitment 
to carrying out a terrorist act. 
The next group identified coordinated and carried out a series of deadly attacks across 
Paris in November 2015, resulting in 137 deaths in total. The first strike took place at the Stade 
de France, followed by a series of shootings and a suicide bombing at cafés and restaurants, 
ending in a mass shooting at the Bataclan Theatre. The attacks were the deadliest in France 
since the second World War179, and in the European Union since the Madrid bombing in 
2004180. Among the perpetrators of the attacks, five have been identified as French nationals, 
namely, Bilal Hadfi, Salah Abdeslam, Brahim Abdeslam, Ismael Omar Mostefai, and Samy 
Amimour although Hadfi, and the Abdeslam brothers were born and raised in Belgium181. For 
this reason, only the profiles of Mostefai and Amimour are considered here and this is done 
simultaneously in order to reveal any parallels between the two. 
These two share certain similarities, which can indicate similar paths of radicalisation, 
however as we have noted in the previous Chapters and earlier in this Chapter, the process is 
necessarily individualistic, and it is extremely difficult to establish an archetype radical. They 
are from the same age-group, aged 28 (Amimour) and 29 (Mostefai), and are both French 
nationals of Algerian origin, both men attended groups or mosques known to be frequented by 
Salafists, and both left France for Syria in 2013 and 2014182. Neither of the individuals had been 
in prison, however they had a history of petty delinquencies and both were under surveillance 
by Belgian authorities following their trips abroad. Accounts by those who knew each of them 
hint towards rapid alterations in their behaviour following their time spent abroad. It is possible 
to deduce that this period may have radically altered their approach to religion, and therefore 
their perception of their life situation, indicating that they had succumbed to indoctrination and 
may have passed into the stage of jihadization, as identified in the model of radicalisation 
proposed by Silber and Bhatt183.  
The final profile investigated is that of Mohamed Merah, who committed a series of three 
attacks killing a total of seven people in Toulouse and Montauban in 2012. This case, which 
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predates the attacks examined above, has been included for its particular relevance for the 
theory. Merah, aged twenty-four at the time of the attacks, a French citizen of Algerian origin, 
was raised alongside his four siblings by his divorced mother. He had a history of petty crimes 
and spent two periods in prison in 2007 and 2009, he was known to the French authorities as 
he had travelled abroad to Pakistan in 2010 and 2011. He claimed allegiance to al Qaeda and 
stated himself that his attacks were a retaliation to French foreign policy, the situation in 
Palestine, and the 2004 ‘headscarf ban’184. A close acquaintance of his made a statement which 
may more clearly illustrate the situation:  
“Our passports may say that we are French, but we don’t feel French because we 
were never accepted here. No one can excuse what he did, but he is a product of 
French society, of the feeling that he had no hope and nothing to lose. It was not Al 
Qaeda that created Mohammed Merah. It was France.”185 
Arguably, the case of Mohamed Merah provides an example which illustrates the many factors 
featuring in the models of radicalism discussed above, as well as those which were identified 
in the previous two Chapters.  
Issues concerning identity and belonging in France are of importance, as well as those 
pertaining to the application of laïcité in contemporary French society. It is suggested that both 
of these factors almost certainly have played a part in the radicalisation of French Muslims who 
often perceive themselves as rejected by mainstream society due to racial, ethnic and religious 
discrimination. This investigation also illustrates how ostracism, caused by this rejection, can 
affect an individual’s behaviour, making them more susceptible to extremist ideologies, and 
encouraging them to adhere to a larger group ideology in order to compensate for the lack of 
control over their present situation and of their sense of not belonging. Furthermore, this case 
illustrates how, once an individual has become affiliated with a larger group ideology, in this 
case al Qaeda, that the risk that they will carry out a violent attack as a type of revenge is vastly 
increased. 
This Chapter has tested the hypothesis against three profile categories which emerge as 
the groups most vulnerable to Islamist radicalisation. Although not exclusive to France, they 
are prominent among those which have been studied in connection to homegrown radicalisation 
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and terrorism in the West. These groups were studied in the French context to investigate 
whether there were factors connected to the hypothesis and particularly the application of 
laïcité, or perceptions of this, which altered the individual’s understanding of their present 
situation. It was found that within the three groups there were factors connected to relative 
deprivation, discrimination, identity and religion which featured prominently, indicating a 
correlation with the hypothesis. Finally, an investigation into the profiles of French homegrown 
terrorists questioned whether the hypothesis and the established mechanisms leading to 
radicalisation were applicable in these cases. In almost every case there were correlations 
between the profiles, the processes of radicalisation, and the hypothesis that laïcité contributes 
towards producing the circumstances under which certain individuals become more susceptible 
to extremist ideologies and therefore vulnerable to Islamist radicalisation 
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Conclusion 
This Thesis has addressed various issues concerning the radicalisation of French 
Muslims by examining the socio-psychological factors connected to this. The first Chapter 
established a historical context of the case. The Muslim identity, by its very nature, especially 
in the case of female adherents, is a visible religious identity and for that reason, it is perceived 
as being targeted by strict French secular laws which limit the expression of religious affiliation 
in the public sphere. The debate on laïcité has prompted many to argue that the way in which it 
is applied today is increasingly fundamentalist, subverting the principles it was supposed to 
protect as stated in the 1905 law, such as the equality of religions, and the freedom of worship 
in the Republic. The analysis presented several theoretical concepts with a focus on homegrown 
Islamist radicalisation and terrorism in France. The second Chapter grounded the hypothesis in 
theories of the psychology of terrorism in order to discern under which circumstances certain 
individuals become more susceptible to adhering to extremist interpretations or fundamentalist 
ideologies. An examination of five renowned models of radicalisation revealed several common 
socio-psychological factors identified in this Chapter as being causal mechanisms in the process 
of homegrown radicalisation. Following this, the study described how ostracism affects an 
individual and linked this to the types of social exclusion experienced by Muslims in France. 
This demonstrated how the process of ostracism of French Muslims can facilitate their 
radicalisation, particularly how policies of laïcité cause the individual to suppress their religious 
identity, which is equivalent to being ostracised. When coupled with the Islamophobic attitudes 
of mainstream French society, this can cause them to seek refuge in their religious identity. This 
identity is strengthened when the individual begins to adhere to a larger group ideology and, 
behaving in accordance with it, will eventually come to legitimise violent action against the 
ostracising group. 
Although this hypothesis cannot be proven outright, this Thesis has nonetheless 
contributed to the important discourse on homegrown Islamist radicalisation in France and has 
presented sufficient strong evidence to suggest that indeed laïcité could be one of the key 
catalysts leading towards the radicalisation of vulnerable French Muslims. Chapter Three 
served as a type of congruence test and provided useful empirical evidence which helps towards 
determining the relative causal weights for the independent variables, such as laïcité, social 
exclusion, discrimination, and ostracism. The small number of cases selected provide the most 
interesting examples of individuals most susceptible to radicalization and outline the 
circumstances specifically applicable to them. As demonstrated in the first two Chapters, 
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citizenship, identity, religion, integration, social relations, laïcité, and political activism are all 
interconnected in the study of radicalization of French Muslims. Assimilationist policies help 
foreigners to adapt to Western values and therefore should be assisting the adoption of the 
national identity of their host country. However, many are at risk of ostracism and racial or 
religious discrimination by mainstream society. Multiple social and psychological factors 
feature in this discussion and therefore it is worth repeating the significance of an 
interdisciplinary approach in studying radicalization of Muslims in the West. 
Throughout the Thesis some prominent issues have been raised concerning the 
hypothesis, the most pressing concern is that the intensification of the application of laïcité is 
impacting on Muslims identity building and is contributing to their marginalization caused by 
discrimination. Barriers to integration and troubles associated with discrimination encountered 
daily by Muslim immigrants or their descendants living in Europe markedly alienate them and 
contribute to their exclusion from the social apparatus. Their search for acceptance and a sense 
of belonging can lead them to being overtly vulnerable to religious extremism and 
radicalization. In the models of radicalization and the cases studied, the most important 
situational and cognitive factors can be summarized as: social deprivation, injustice, inequality, 
cognitive opening, (religious) seeking, intergroup relations, self-awareness, interaction, 
inclusion and exclusion, their life situation, self-identification, indoctrination, a sense of moral 
outrage, worldview, resonance with personal experience and mobilization. 
It is necessary to draw parallels between these factors and the process and effects of 
ostracism, as many of the socio-psychological factors in radicalisation can emanate from the 
negative effects of being excluded from a group. The more an individual perceives him or 
herself as a victim of society the more this shall be conceived of as exclusion and stigmatisation. 
Individuals become highly influenceable once they feel they lack control or meaningfulness, 
which they try to compensate for, often by seeking belonging in an alternative group. It is 
defendable to claim that when French Muslims are excluded from mainstream society they will 
seek a new ingroup to make up for not feeling accepted, and in a perilous state of 
influenceability, they are likely to be more susceptible to radicalisation. The discussion has 
brought forward strong evidence for the hypothesis that laïcité can be a key driver or 
contributory factor in this process, particularly the politics of suppression of one’s religious 
identity, which is a type of ostracism. 
It is possible to identify behavioural changes in the early stages of the processes of both 
ostracism and radicalisation and it is urgent that societies are educated to make their 
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identification possible. If an individual is approached and their situation improved through 
stronger family and social ties, it is less likely that the non-negligible effects of discrimination, 
exclusion, ostracism and extremism will occur. Further research into the effects of social and 
cognitive factors in the process of radicalisation is paramount and should focus on advancing 
our knowledge of the effects of ostracism, political processes, secularism, and social 
relationships, either separately or in connection. It would be possible to extend the research as 
mechanisms identified in the present research are transferrable to other religious minorities and 
more or less secular fundamentalist societies. Moreover, by applying similar methods of study 
to other societies, new mechanisms may be revealed which could contribute further to reducing 
cases of homegrown radicalisation in the West. 
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